By Valerie Silverman Massey
In the recent case of Kaushansky v. Stonecroft Attorneys, APC, (Cal. Ct. App., Mar. 14, 2025, No. B317069) 2025 WL 814965, reh’g denied (Mar. 27, 2025), the court addressed a crucial aspect of professional conduct by examining the emotional distress suffered by a client due to the conduct of their attorney. Plaintiff, Kaushansky, filed a breach of fiduciary duty action (amongst others) against her former attorney, Stonecroft Attorneys, APC, after the attorney withdrew from representation.
“The scope of an attorney’s fiduciary duty may be determined as a matter of law based on the Rules of Professional Conduct [CRPC] which, ‘together with statutes and general principles relating to other fiduciary relationships, all help define … the fiduciary duty which an attorney owes to his [or her] client. [citation omitted] Emotional distress damages may be recoverable if directly caused by an attorney’s conduct in breach of his fiduciary duties. [citation omitted]” Kaushansky at *9. The basis for recovery of emotional distress damages in a legal malpractice action is distinctly different from a claim based primarily on the client’s economic interests and the emotional injury derived from an economic loss. Kaushansky had to prove that the malpractice, or Rule 1.16(d) violation, was the proximate cause of the emotional harm.
The court determined Stonecroft breached its fiduciary duty to Kaushansky by violating CRPC Rule1.16(d). Stonecroft “‘essentially browbeat Plaintiff into signing the substitution of attorney form without informing her about the litigation landscape,” which consisted of impending discovery cut-off and trial dates, and discovery and sanctions motions. Despite these issues, Stonecroft “took no steps at all to protect Plaintiff from the reasonably foreseeable prejudice arising from Defendants’ abrupt disappearance.” Id. at *4.
CRPC Rule 1.16 outlines the duties and limitations regarding an attorney’s withdrawal from a case. Specifically, Rule 1.16(d) requires that a lawyer not terminate a representation until the lawyer has taken reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client. Reasonable steps include providing reasonable notice to the client with time to retain new counsel, handing over relevant files or documentation, and advising the client of the litigation “litigation landscape.” CRPC Rule1.16(d) and (e). Rule 1.16(d) captures the ethical principle that attorneys have a duty to not cause unnecessary harm to the client’s interests. The court ruled that the attorney’s abrupt withdrawal, under these circumstances, contributed to the emotional distress suffered by Kaushansky. The emotional harm was deemed to be a foreseeable consequence of the attorney’s unethical withdrawal, and thus compensable under the framework of legal malpractice.
This ruling reinforces the idea that an attorney’s withdrawal from representation is not a mere procedural matter—it carries potential emotional and legal consequences for the client. Moreover, this case highlights the intersection between the ethical rules governing attorney conduct and the potential for clients to seek redress for emotional distress resulting from a lawyer’s failure to comply with those rules, and the importance of diligent and responsible handling of client relationships, including disengagements. This ruling provides a cautionary tale for legal practitioners.